Abstract. In [5] Cramer et al. proposed a public-key encryption scheme secure against adversaries with a bounded number of decryption queries based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. In this paper, we show that the same result can be obtained based on weaker computational assumptions, namely: the computational Diffie-Hellman and the hashed Diffie-Hellman assumptions.
Introduction
The highest level of security for public-key cryptosystems is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2), proposed by Rackoff and Simon [28] in 1991. The development of cryptosystems with such feature can be viewed as a complex task. Several public-key encryption (PKE) schemes have been proposed with either practical or theoretical purposes. It is possible to obtain IND-CCA2 secure cryptosystems based on many assumptions such as: decisional Diffie-Hellman [7, 8, 26] , computational Diffie-Hellman [6, 20] , factoring [22] , McEliece [13, 12] , quadratic residuosity [8] and learning with errors [26, 25] .
Currently there are few general paradigms for the elaboration of IND-CCA2 PKE schemes. The first paradigm was proposed by Dwork, Dolev and Naor [11] , and is an enhancement of an construction proposed by Naor and Yung [24] (which only achieved non-adaptive IND-CCA security). This scheme is based on non-interactive zero-knowledge techniques. Later Sahai [30] and Lindell [23] made other improvements following the same approach of [11] .
Our Contribution
We improve upon the results presented [5] . Namely, we show that it is possible to obtain an IND-q-CCA2 PKE scheme with optimal ciphertext length (one group element) based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Additionally, we also show a more efficient scheme based on the hashed DiffieHellman (HDH) assumption. The ideas behind the proofs are similar to the ones presented in [5] , although, in the proof of security of our HDH based scheme, to map the key to the HDH challenge, we make use of a strategy that is not obvious. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no such claims appeared before in the literature.
We also note that recently, Haralambiev et al. [20] proposed an improvement of [19] , and obtained a CCA secure PKE based on the CDH assumption without any kind of assumption on the number of queries an adversary performs to the decryption oracle. However, their scheme presents a larger ciphertext length when compared to ours.
An abstract of this work appeared in the Information Security Conference (ISC) 2010 [27] .
Preliminaries
In this section we present some definitions which were used in the construction of our scheme. We refer the reader to [7] , [5] , [31] , [29] , [21] , [18] and [4] for more details.
Notation
If X is a set then x $ ← X denotes the act of choosing an element of X according to the uniform distribution. We write w $ ← A O (x, y, ...) to indicate that an (probabilistic) algorithm A with inputs x, y, . . . and black-box access to an oracle O outputs w. We denote by Pr[E] the probability that the event E occurs. We use λ for the security parameter.
public-key Encryption
A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A public-key encryption scheme is a triplet of algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) such that:
-Gen is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and outputs a public-key pk and a secret key sk. The public-key specifies the message space M and the ciphertext space C.
-Enc is a PPT encryption algorithm which receives as input a public-key pk and a message M ∈ M, and outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C.
-Dec is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext C, and outputs either a message M ∈ M or an error symbol ⊥.
-(Soundness) For any pair (pk,sk) of keys generated by Gen and any message M ∈ M it holds that Dec(sk,Enc(pk,M))=M with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by Gen and Enc.
Next, we define the notion of IND-q-CCA2 security.
Definition 2.
(IND-q-CCA2 security) For a function q: N → N and a two stage adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) against PKE we associate the following experiment Exp
(pk,sk)
The adversary A is allowed to ask at most q(λ) queries to the decryption oracle Dec. None of the queries of A 2 may contain C * . We define the advantage of A in the experiment as
We say that PKE is indistinguishable against q-bounded adaptive chosenciphertext attack (IND-q-CCA2) if for all PPT adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that makes a polynomial number of oracle queries the advantage of A in the experiment is a negligible function of λ.
Number Theoretic Assumptions
In this section we state two of the Diffie-Hellman intractability assumptions: Computational Diffie-Hellman and Hashed Diffie-Hellman.
Definition 3 (CDH assumption). Let G be a group of order p (which depends on the security parameter λ) and g be a generator of G. For all PPT adversaries A, the CDH advantage against G is defined as
The CDH assumption holds if for every PPT adversary A the function Adv
Definition 4 (Hashed-DH Assumption). Let G be a group of order p (which depends on the security parameter λ) and g be a generator of G. Let H: G → {0, 1}
n be a hash function. For a security parameter λ, the sets D λ and T λ are defined as:
In this weakening of the DDH assumption, the set D λ is the set with respect to values of Diffie-Hellman triples. T λ is a set with a random element. For ρ ∈ {D λ , T λ }, let A be a 0/1-valued PPT adversarial algorithm and let ζ be A's guess about the triple ρ. The HDH advantage of A against G and H is defined as
The HDH assumption holds for G and H if for every PPT adversary A the function Adv Throughout this paper we will abbreviate cdh = Adv 
2.4
Goldreich-Levin Hard-Core Function
Let G be a group of order p and generator g, and x, y ∈ Z p . Let h: G×{0, 1} u → {0, 1}
v denote the Goldreich-Levin hard-core function [16] for g xy (given g x and g y ), with randomness space {0, 1} u and range {0, 1} v , where u, v ∈ Z.
Theorem 1.
Suppose that A is a PPT algorithm such that A(g x , g y , r, k) distinguishes k= h(g xy , r) from a uniform string s ∈ {0, 1} v with non-negligible advantage, for random x, y ∈ Z p and random r ∈ {0, 1} u . Then there exists a PPT algorithm B that computes g xy with non-negligible probability given g x and g y (for random x, y ∈ Z p ).
Target Collision Resistant Hash Functions
λ be a family of hash functions. The target collision resistance property is defined using the following experiment executed with a PPT adversary A:
The family of hash functions TCR is target collision resistant if for every PPT adversary A it holds that Exp TCR A,TCR (·) is a negligible function of λ.
Strong Pseudorandom Permutation
v be a family of permutations, and
v be an instance of π, which is indexed by k ∈ {0, 1} λ . Let P be the set of all permutations for bit strings of size v, and A be a 0/1-valued PPT adversary. Consider the following experiments:
where permutations π K , π
v is said to be a strong pseudorandom permutation if for every PPT A it holds that Adv sprp A,π (·) is negligible in λ.
We abbreviate sprp = Adv sprp A,π (λ).
Cover Free Families
Let S be a set, and F a set of subsets of S. Let d, s, q be positive integers, where |S| = d and |F| = s. We denote the elements of F by F j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ s. We say F is a q-cover-free family, if for any q elements of F, F j1 , . . . , F jq ∈ F, and any other element of F, F i / ∈ {F j1 , . . . , F jq }, we have
Additionally, we say the family F is -uniform if
There is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that on input s, q returns , d, F such that the set F (which has cardinality s) is a -uniform q-cover-free family over {1, . . . , d}, for = d 4q and d ≤ 16q
2 log s. For a security parameter λ and a bound on decryption queries q(λ), the cover-free family used in our construction has the following parameters:
Hybrid Encryption
Our schemes make use of the hybrid encryption method [9] . Such schemes use public-key encryption techniques to encrypt a random symmetric key K, which is then used to encrypt the actual message using a symmetric encryption scheme. This mechanism is homologous to public-key encryption scheme, but instead of encrypting a message, the encryption algorithm generates a random key and encrypts it.
Key Encapsulation Mechanism A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) is defined as follows:
Definition 7 (Key Encapsulation Mechanism). A key encapsulation mechanism is a triplet of algorithms (KGen, KEnc, KDec) such that:
-KGen is a PPT key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and outputs a public-key pk and a secret key sk. The public-key specifies the symmetric-key space K and the ciphertext space C.
-KEnc is a PPT encryption algorithm which receives as input a public-key pk, and outputs (C, K), where K $ ← K is a symmetric key, and C ∈ C is a encapsulated symmetric key (i.e., the ciphertext).
-KDec is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret-key sk and a ciphertext C, and outputs a symmetric key K ∈ K or an error symbol ⊥.
-(Soundness) For any pair of public and secret keys generated by KGen and any pair (C, K) generated by KEnc it holds that KDec(sk,C)=K with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by KGen and KEnc.
Definition 8 (Key Encapsulation Mechanism CCA Security). To a two stage adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) against KEM we associate the following experiment Exp
The adversary A 2 is not allowed to query KDec(sk, ·) with K . The advantage of A in the experiment is
A KEM is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack if for all PPT adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ) the advantage of A in the experiment Adv 
IND-q-CCA2 Encryption From CDH
Our first construction yields a IND-q-CCA PKE scheme based on CDH assumption with optimal ciphertext length. The symmetric-key encryption scheme is constructed based on strong pseudorandom permutations, as in [18] , in order to obtain the redundancy-free property and security against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Furthermore, we use the randomness established in the encryption phase and a target collision resistant hash function in order to define the index t of the element of the q-cover-free family F that will be used in the encryption. We use a hardcore function to construct the symmetric key.
It can be assured, due to the property of cover-free families and the unduplicatable set selection, that at least one element of the decryption key set will remain secret, since it will not be required to respond any decryption queries (of course considering the limit ofueries to the decryption oracle).
Construction. We assume the existence of a cyclic group G of prime-order p where the CDH assumption is believed to hold, i.e., given (g, g x , g y ) there is no efficient way to compute g xy , for a generator g ∈ G, and random x, y ∈ Z p . Let TCR: G → {0, 1} λ be a target collision resistant hash function, h: G×{0, 1} u → {0, 1}
k be a hard-core function family, and π: {0, 1} k × {0, 1} v → {0, 1} v be a permutation family where the index space is {0, 1} k . Our scheme from CDH assumption consists of the following algorithms:
Output the public-key pk = (X 1 , . . . , X d(λ) , a) and the secret-key sk = (x 1 , . . . , x d(λ) ). Enc(pk, M):
Let j = TCR(r) and let F j = {j 1 , . . . , j (λ) } be the j-th element of F. SetC = r and compute
, a)). To encrypt the message M, run the symmetric-key encryption to obtain the ciphertext ψ←π K (M). Output C = (C, ψ).
Dec(sk, C): Compute j = TCR(C) to obtain the subset F j , and compute the session's symmetric key
Theorem 1 Assuming that the CDH assumption holds, TCR is a target collision resistant hash function, h is a hardcore function, and π is strongly pseudorandom, the above scheme is IND-q-CCA2.
Proof. We follow the same approach of [5] to prove the above lemma via a gamebased proof. We prove that the KEM is IND-q-CCA2 secure and then use the KEM/DEM composition theorem from [9] . Let Game 0 be the KEM-IND-q-CCA game with adversary A where the challenge ciphertext isC * = r * = g y (from the CDH tuple). Let X 0 denote the event that A's final guess is correct (i.e. X 0 denotes that β = β ). For later games, let X i (i > 0) be defined analogously. We have:
Game 1 is identical to Game 0, except that the challengeC * is initially chosen, and all decapsulation queries with TCR(C) = TCR(C * ) are rejected. By reduction on the security of the TCR, one can show that
for a suitable adversary V, where TCR is the probability that V finds TCR(C) = TCR(C * ) forC =C * and q p is an upper bound on the probability that A 1 ask the decryption oracle to decryptC * . Game 2 is equivalent to Game 1. In this game, we will define
is the i-th decapsulation request of A, j i = TCR(C i ) and F j i are the sets of PKE key pairs associated with the respective i-th query.
Define t := min(F j * \Q), for j * = TCR(C * ) (it is always possible since F j * Q). Additionally choose uniformly and independently α ∈ F j * . Call ABORT the event that α = t . Note that 
In Game 4, we immediately stop the experiment and set ABORT to true (hence immediately taking a random bit for A s output) as soon as A asks for a decapsulation whereC =C * and α ∈ F j where j = TCR(C). Note that already in Game 3, such a query would have implied t = α and hence ABORT. Consequently, Pr [ X 4 ] = Pr [ X 3 ]. Note that in this experiment x α is not necessary to answer the decryption queries.
In Game 5, we use g x (from the CDH tuple) instead of g xα . Note that the probability distribution of the keys does not change. To answer the challenge query, we receive from the CDH oracle a value z that is equal to either the hardcore function of g xy or a random value in {0, 1} k . Then we form K * as h(X Collecting the probabilities we have that:
IND-q-CCA2 Encryption From HDH
This construction is a variation of the one presented above. It yields in a INDq-CCA PKE scheme based on HDH assumption also with optimal ciphertext length. In this construction, we equally make use of key encapsulation method to construct a key to be used in a symmetric encryption. In this construction, instead of defining the encapsulated key as the product of hardcore functions (similarly to the previous scheme), we define the encapsulated key as the hash of the product of all keys. This makes the scheme more efficient.
Construction. We assume the existence of a cyclic group G of prime-order p and a hash function H: G → {0, 1} k for which the HDH assumption holds. Let TCR: G → {0, 1} λ be a target collision resistant hash function and π: {0,
v be a permutation family where the index space is {0, 1} k Our scheme from the HDH assumption consists of the following algorithms:
Output the public-key pk = (X 1 , . . . , X d(λ) ) and the secret-key sk = (x 1 , . . . , x d(λ) ).
Let j = TCR(r) and let F j = {j 1 , . . . , j (λ) } be the j-th element of F. SetC = r and compute K = H(( ji∈Fj X ji ) b ). To encrypt the message M, run the symmetric-key encryption to obtain the ciphertext ψ←π K (M). Output C = (C, ψ).
Dec(sk, C): Compute j = TCR(C) to obtain the subset F j , and compute the session's
Theorem 2 Assuming that the HDH assumption holds, TCR is a target collision resistant hash function, and π is a strongly pseudorandom permutation, the scheme above is IND-q-CCA2.
Proof. The proof is similar to the previous one.
Let Game 0 be the KEM-IND-q-CCA game with adversary A where the challengeC * = r * = g y (g y from the HDH tuple). Let X 0 denote the event that A's final guess is correct (i.e. X 0 denotes that β = β ). For later games, let X i (i > 0) be defined analogously. We have:
Game 1 is identical to Game 0, except thatC * is initially chosen, and all decapsulation queries with TCR(C) = TCR(C * ) are rejected. By reduction on the security of the TCR, one can show that
Define t := min(F j * \Q), for j * = TCR(C * ) (it is always possible since F j * Q). Additionally choose uniformly and independently α ∈ F j * . Call ABORT the event that α = t . Note that
so the events X 2 and ABORT are independent, and in particular, Pr [
Since we did not actually change anything, Pr [
In Game 3, we substitute A s output β with a random bit whenever ABORT occurs. Obviously, Pr [
Since Pr [ ABORT ] = −1 in Game 3 as well, we can establish that
In Game 5, we modify X α to
where g x is from the HDH tuple. Note that the probability distribution of the keys does not change, so Pr [ X 5 ] = Pr [ X 4 ]. In this game if β = 0, K = H(g xy ) and if β = 1, K is random.
Collecting the probabilities we have that:
Expanding the Encapsulated Key in the CDH Scheme
The IND-q-CCA KEM scheme based on the CDH assumption proposed in section 3 results in a small symmetric key. In this section we show how to expand the key without increasing the size of the ciphertext overhead. A symmetric key of size kn is obtained by generating n groups of secret/public-keys. Construction. As in section 3, we assume the existence of a cyclic group G of prime-order p where the CDH assumption is believed to hold. Let TCR: G → {0, 1} λ be a target collision resistant hash function, h: G×{0, 1} u → {0, 1} k be a hard-core function family, and π: {0, 1} kn × {0, 1} v → {0, 1} v be a permutation family where the index space is {0, 1} kn . Our modified scheme from the CDH assumption works as follows: (x m,1 , . . . , x m,d(λ) ). The public-key is pk = {pk 1 , . . . , pk n , a}, and the secret key is sk = {sk 1 , . . . , sk n }. Enc(pk, M):
, a)) for m = 1, . . . , n. Define K = K 1 ||K 2 || . . . ||K n . To encrypt the message M, run the symmetric-key encryption to obtain the ciphertext ψ←π K (M). Output C = (C, ψ).
Theorem 3 Assuming that the CDH assumption holds, TCR is a target collision resistant hash function, h is a hardcore function, and π is strongly pseudorandom, the above scheme is IND-q-CCA2.
Proof. In addition to the approach used in previous sections, we use an hybrid argument to prove the security of the above scheme. Let Game 0 be the KEM-IND-q-CCA game with adversary A where the challenge ciphertext isC * = r * = g y (from the CDH tuple). Let X 0 denote the event that A's final guess is correct (i.e. X 0 denotes that β = β ). For later games, let X i (i > 0) be defined analogously. We have:
so the events X 2 and ABORT are independent, and in particular, Pr In Game 4, we immediately stop the experiment and set ABORT to true (hence immediately taking a random bit for A s output) as soon as A asks for a decapsulation whereC =C * and α ∈ F j where j = TCR(C). Note that already in Game 3, such a query would have implied t = α and hence ABORT. Consequently, Pr [ X 4 ] = Pr [ X 3 ]. Note that in this experiment x α is not necessary to answer the decryption queries.
In the following games, we demonstrate, by a standard hybrid argument, that any PPT adversary has a negligible advantage in distinguishing a real key from a random string of same size.
We start the exposition of the hybrid argument constructing the key as described in the protocol, i.e., a well formed key. On each upcoming game, we replace a component of the key with a random element of the same size, so the difference of adjacent games will be of only one key component. In the last game, we will have a completely random key.
In Game 5, the challenge key is formed as:
Since it consists in a well formed key, Pr [ X 5 ] = Pr [ X 4 ]. In Game 6, the challenge key will be constructed in the following way:
where rnd 1 is a random element from {0, 1} k . The last component K n in Game 5 is formed as , a)
We can see that distinguishing K n from a random element of {0, 1} k implies in distinguishing h((g x k,α ) y , a) from a random element of {0, 1} k . From theorem 1, an adversary that distinguishes h((g x k,α ) y , a) from a random element of {0, 1} k , solves the CDH problem. Therefore, if the CDH assumption holds, Pr [ X 6 ] − Pr [ X 5 ] ≤ , where is a negligible function. In Game 5+i, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, the challenge key is formed as the following: Collecting the probabilities we have that:
Adv kem-ind-q-cca2 PKE,A (λ) ≤ 2 · tcr + · λ · + 2q p .
